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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-3717
                    
JAMES CREEGAN,
                                      Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-05944
District Judge:  The Honorable  William J. Martini
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2005  
                    
Before: ROTH, RENDELL, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2005 )
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
This is an appeal by James Creegan from the District Court’s affirmance of the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying him disability benefits.  Creegan
      After surgery to correct a right heel spur, Creegan no longer experiences leg pain.  1
     The ALJ found that, as of October 1998, Creegan’s depression was severe, but that2
the single major depressive episode which occurred in that month did not last long
enough to satisfy the twelve-month durational requirement for a disability nor did it meet
or equal any of the listings.  See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 217-222 (2002).  These findings are supported by the medical reports of his
examining doctors, Drs. Candela, Macchia, and Gorman, all of which indicated that his
depressive had improved.  We do not suggest, nor did the ALJ, that Creegan did not at
one point suffer severe depression but, as the ALJ found, his depression “significantly
improved,” and quickly improved, with medication.  A-23.  . 
2
submits that, for various reasons, the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial
evidence.  We disagree, and will affirm. 
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case and the District Court has
already given careful attention to each of Creegan’s arguments.  We will, therefore, limit
our discussion to those facts relevant to our decision. Creegan filed an application for
disability due to back impairments and depression.   The ALJ determined that Creegan1
failed to meet his burden at steps three and four of the requisite five-step procedure, and,
notwithstanding his back impairments,  found that he could perform light work and that2
significant jobs existed in the national economy.  
Creegan attacks the ALJ’s analysis at step three, arguing that she did not articulate
a basis for her finding that his impairments did not meet or equal the requirements of a
listed impairment.  See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.  While not in so many
words citing Listing 1.04, the ALJ implicitly found that the medical evidence failed to
satisfy the criteria of that listing and explicitly found that the evidence established that
3Creegan “has disorders of the back without disk herniation or spinal stenosis and which
has never required surgery.”  A25.  Moreover, Creegan, who had the burden at this stage,
does not point to any evidence in the record suggesting that his impairments met or
equaled any listings’ criteria.  Accordingly, we reject his argument addressed to step
three. 
At step four, the ALJ found that Creegan’s residual functional capacity permitted
him to perform light work, i.e., he can lift twenty pounds and walk or stand six hours a
day.  In support of this finding, the ALJ cited medical evidence provided by the VA
Medical Center and Dr. Sawicki that Creegan has full muscle and motor strength.  The
ALJ also cited Dr. Shah’s report that, despite lumber flexion to only forty degrees and
extension to fifteen degrees, Creegan’s range of motion in his bilateral lower extremities
was “essentially within functional limits, and he was able to perform FABER test without
difficulty.” A21.  Indeed, Creegan concedes that the ALJ spent two and one-half pages of
her opinion reciting the medical evidence to support the conclusion that he was able to
perform light work.  But, says Creegan, she did not explain how the evidence she recited
led to that RFC.  We find, without further discussion, that she did just that.   
As for Creegan’s complaint that the ALJ did not properly analyze his subjective
complaints, and particularly his complaints of pain, it is well established that an ALJ may
give more weight to particular evidence so long as he or she explains why.  See Burnett v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).  The ALJ found that while Creegan has
     At step five, the ALJ must analyze if there are sufficient jobs in the national economy. 3
Before doing so, however, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers from an
exertional impairment or both non-exertional and exertional impairments.  See Sykes v.
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2000).  If the claimant only suffers from an exertional
impairment, the ALJ may rely on the grids; otherwise, he or she must call in a vocational
expert.
4
impairments that could cause the pain alleged, any pain he experiences is not of such
intensity or frequency to preclude work, and the pain he alleges is neither consistent with
the objective medical evidence nor credible to the extent alleged.  These conclusions were
well supported in the record because, as the ALJ found, Creegan does not take prescribed
pain medication, has never been required to undergo back surgery, and diagnostic testing
revealed no disk herniation or spinal stenosis.  Moreover, Creegan’s testimony, which he
would now have us discount, established that any impairment he may have does not
disrupt his ability to perform various tasks.  Dr. Mylod’s “conflicting evidence” was
discussed and rejected by the ALJ because this testimony was at odds with Creegan’s
testimony.  The ALJ’s step four determination was supported by substantial evidence.
 The ALJ went on to find that Creegan’s impairments did not permit him to
continue working as a maintenance worker, delivery driver, or steel warehouse worker
because these jobs require heavy lifting.  Thus, the burden shifted to the ALJ to determine
if Creegan was capable of performing jobs that correspond to his functional limitations at
step five of the sequential evaluation.3
Creegan argues that the ALJ was not permitted to rely on the grids at step five
5because he suffers from a non-exertional impairment -- depression.  This argument fails
because, as discussed above, Creegan’s single episode of major depression did not meet
the durational requirements of the Act and any depression did not impact his ability to
perform the full range of light work.  As such, Creegan’s only impairments were
exertional and ALJ was permitted to rely on the grids.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the July 19, 2004 order of District Court. 
